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New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
In an attempt to promote democratic change, the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992' extended the existing prohibition of trade with Cuba.2 The
Act purports to prohibit transactions with Cuba or its nationals by
firms, wherever organized or doing business, that are owned or controlled
by United States residents or nationals.' The nations within which these
firms are located have expressed their opposition to this extraterritorial
prohibition.4 They claim it is a violation of the sovereignty and equality
of states under principles of international law.
Part I of this comment examines the Cuban Democracy Act and
the regulations it modifies. Part II addresses whether the United States
has the authority under international law to prohibit trade between Cuba
and United States owned or controlled firms organized and operating
in third countries. Finally, Part III addresses whether the United States
has the authority to do so under United States law, considering partic-
ularly the Constitution and the role of international law in the United
States legal system.
I. THE CACR AND THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT
Under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917
(TWEA),' the Treasury Department issued the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations (CACR) 6 in 1963. The CACR prohibits all "transactions
© Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-484, §§ 1701-1712, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992).
2. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1992).
3. Id. § 515.329.
4. David C. Scott, The World From Mexico City, Christian Science Monitor, Oct.
28, 1992, at 3 (Officials from Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina express their
opposition to the Cuban Democracy Act); Pascal C. Fletcher, Cuba Says U.S. Trade
Squeeze Could Backfire, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 23, 1992 (Britain, Canada, and EC
express opposition to the Cuban Democracy Act).
5. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1-44 (1988)).
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225-26, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3029 (1984). "[In 1963, the]
TWEA gave the President broad authority to impose comprehensive embargoes on foreign
countries as one means of dealing with both peacetime emergencies and times of war."
In 1963, § 5(b) of TWEA provided:
(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,
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involv[ing] property in which [Cuba], or any national thereof, has ...
any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect" 7 by "any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' The term
"person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is defined as
including:
(a) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident
of the United States;
by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) As used in this subdivision the term "United States" means the United
States and any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof: Provided however, That
the foregoing shall not be construed as a limitation upon the power of the
President, which is hereby conferred, to prescribe from time to time, definitions,
not inconsistent with the purposes of this subdivision, for any or all of the
terms used in this subdivision .... As used in this subdivision the term "person"
means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation.
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1958) (quoted in Regan, 468 U.S. at 226 n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 3029-
30 n.2).
The President has delegated his authority under TWEA to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Executive Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174-1177 (1942) (cited in Regan, 468 U.S.
at 226 n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 3029-30 n.2).
In 1977 Congress amended section 5(b) of TWEA limiting the President's power to
times of war, but grandfathered until 1978 the President's national emergency authority
being exercised under TWEA. Additionally, the Act now allows the President to extend
the exercise of such authority for one year periods upon a determination that such extension
is in the national interest. Pub. L. No. 95-223 § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). See also
note following 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988). For the Presidential extensions see 57 Fed.
Reg. 43,125 (1992), 56 Fed. Reg. 48,415 (1991), 55 Fed. Reg. 37,309 (1990), 54 Fed.
Reg. 37,089 (1989), 53 Fed. Reg. 35,289 (1988), 52 Fed. Reg. 33,397 (1987), 51 Fed.
Reg. 30,201 (1986), 50 Fed. Reg. 36,563 (1985), 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927 (1984), 48 Fed.
Reg. 40,695 (1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797 (1982), 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321 (1981), 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,549 (1980), 44 Fed. Reg. 53,153 (1979), 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449 (1978).
Concerning "excessive" delegation, the Court has rfcognized that in the international
field Congress may "accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S. Ct. 216, 221
(1936).
Congress originally adopted the CACR to deal with the peacetime emergency created
by Cuban attempts to destabilize governments throughout Latin America. See Presidential
Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-1963).
6. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1992).
7. Id. § 515.201(b).
8. Id. § 515.201(b)(1).
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(b) Any person within the United States ... ;
(c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United
States or of any State, territory possession or district of the
United States; and
(d) Any corporation, partnership, or association, wherever or-
ganized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by persons
specified in paragraphs (a) or (c) .... 9
Substantial civil and criminal penalties are provided for violations
of the CACR.' 0
Section 515.559 of the CACR, however, provided an exception to
the broad prohibition on trade with Cuba. Section 515.559 allowed
licensing for certain transactions of "U.S.-owned or controlled firms in
third countries"" if law or policy in the third country required or
favored trade with Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act revokes this ex-
ception to the prohibition, stating that "no license may be issued for
any transaction described in section 515.559. ' '12 Thus, the Cuban De-
mocracy Act effectively prohibits trade between Cuba and overseas firms
owned or controlled by United States residents or nationals.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Relevant Fundamentals
The primary function of international law is to regulate the relations
between international states. a The international legal system has no
formal, central legislature, complete judiciary, or disinterested enforcer.' 4
9. Id. § 515.329.
10.
(a) Whoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act .. .or of
any license, rule, or regulation issued thereunder, and whoever shall willfully
violate, neglect, or refuse to comply with any order of the President issued in
compliance with the provisions of this Act . . .shall, upon conviction, be fined
not more than $50,000, or, if a natural person, imprisoned for not more than
ten years, or both ....
(b)(l) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil penalty of not more
than $50,000 on any person who violates any license, order, rule, or regulation
issued under this Act.
50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1988), as amended by the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-484, § 1710, 106 Stat. 2580-2581 (1992). See 31 C.F.R. § 515.701 (1992).
11. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1992).
12. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1706, 106 Stat. 2578
(1992).
13. Clive Parry, The Function of Law in the International Community, in Manual
of Public International Law 1 (Max Sorenson ed. 1968).
14. Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law 3 (2d ed. 1991).
19931
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The collective power normally vested in these bodies in municipal law
systems remains diffused horizontally among the individual international
states, and each state is obligated to comply with the rules and principles
of the system.' 5 A state violating an obligation of international law is
required to terminate the violation and make reparation. Substantial
international political consequences also may arise from the violation.
There are two primary sources of the rules and principles of inter-
national law: international agreements and international custom.16 In-
ternational agreements are binding, as such, only upon the states
consenting to them. What is agreed to in these instruments, however,
may ultimately become customary international law.
"International custom results from similar and repeated acts by states
- repeated with the conscious conviction of the parties that they are
acting in conformity with law.""' Thus, there are two factors in the
formation of custom: "(1) a material fact-the repetition of similar acts
by states, and (2) a psychological element usually called the opinio juris
sive necessitatis-the feeling on the part of the states that in acting as
they act they are fulfilling a legal obligation."' 8 Customary law is
generally binding upon all states. A rare exception is recognized when
a state has consistently "asserted its refusal to follow the practice from
which the rule has developed."' 9
Consideration is given to three factors in determining the existence
of a rule of customary international law: the writings of scholars, state
pronouncements that are not seriously challenged by other states, and
the judgments and opinions of both international and domestic courts.20
B. Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction
1. Territoriality
"The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic consti-
tutional doctrine of the law of nations .... ' Two principal corollaries
of the sovereignty and equality of states are: "(1) a jurisdiction, prima
15. Id. at 2.
16. Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law 77 (1991).
17. Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law,
18 British Year Book of Int'l L. 127, 129 (1937).
18. Id.
19. D.W. Greig, International Law 18 (2d ed. 1976).
20. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 103 (Am.
Law Inst. 1986) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]. The "Restatement represents the opinion
of The American Law Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if
charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with international law." Id. Intro-
duction, at 3.
21. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 280 (2d ed. 1973).
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facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living
there; and (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jur-
isdiction of other states." ' 22 Thus, territoriality is the primary basis of
jurisdiction, and a state violates international law by prescribing or
enforcing a rule for which it lacks jurisdiction.2 3 The principle of ter-
ritoriality recognizes the state's authority to prescribe rules of law at-
taching legal consequences to conduct within its territory and relating
to the status of persons or things present within its territory. 24
The Cuban Democracy Act's prohibition of trade between Cuba and
United States owned or controlled firms organized and located overseas
attaches legal consequences to conduct occurring outside United States
territory. Thus, the principle of territoriality does not provide a basis
of jurisdiction for the Cuban Democracy Act.
The related principle of objective territoriality recognizes the au-
thority of the state to prescribe a rule of law attaching consequences
to conduct which occurs outside its territory but causes a substantial
effect within its territory. The principle requires that at least one element
of the offense occur within the state.25 The objective territorial principle
is well accepted "with respect to acts such as shooting or even sending
libelous publications across a boundary.1 26 It is also generally accepted
with respect to liability for injuries resulting from products made outside
the state and introduced into the prescribing state's stream of commerce. 27
But, application of the objective territorial principle is controversial
regarding legislation attaching consequences to economic effects in a
territory, particularly anti-trust laws."
The Cuban Democracy Act attaches consequences to extraterritorial
trade activities. Considering that trade by overseas United States sub-
sidiaries with Cuba was $700 million in 199029 and that these firms are
owned or controlled by United States nationals or residents, there may
be a substantial effect in the United States. But, it is an economic
effect, which has been controversial as a basis for jurisdiction. More
importantly, no element of the offense occurs in the United States.
Thus, the principle of objective territoriality does not provide a basis
of jurisdiction for the Cuban Democracy Act.
22. Id.
23. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 8 (Am.
Law Inst. 1965) (hereinafter Restatement (Second)].
24. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 402.
25. See Restatement (Second), supra note 23, § 18; Levi, supra note 14, at 146.
26. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 402 cmt. d.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bush Signs Anti-Cuba Law, Courts Cuban-American Votes, Agence France Presse,
Oct. 23, 1992 [hereinafter Bush signs anti-Cuban Law].
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2. Customary Exceptions to Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction
Although territorial jurisdiction is prima facie exclusive, concurrent
jurisdiction is possible. Customary international law recognizes four bases
of jurisdiction that provide exceptions to exclusive territorial jurisdiction:
(1) the nationality principle, (2) the universality principle, (3) the pro-
tective principle, and (4) the passive personality principle.30
The nationality principle is the most widely accepted exception to
exclusive territorial jurisdiction. Under this principle, a state may pre-
scribe the conduct of its nationals either within or outside its territory. 31
Under international law, an individual has' the nationality of the state
that confers the nationality.32 However, other states may reject this
nationality when a genuine link between the individual and the conferring
state is absent.3 3 Birth in the state's territory (ius soli) or birth to parents
who are nationals (ius sanguinis) are generally accepted as genuine links.3 4
Permanent residence within the state also indicates a genuine link 5. 3 A
state is not required to recognize a nationality imposed by another state
on an unwilling individual;3 6 indeed, a state may violate international
law by imposing its nationality on an unwilling individual.3 7 A corpo-
ration, a legal creation of the state, is considered a national of the state
of incorporation.3" As with individuals, other states may reject the
nationality of a corporation when a genuine link between the corporation
and the conferring state is absent.3 9
Applying the nationality principle to the Cuban Democracy Act, the
principle providei a basis of jurisdiction for the United States over
nationals owning or controlling a corporation organized and operating
in a third country. But it does not provide the United States a basis
of jurisdiction over the corporations which United States nationals or
residents own or control, unless these corporations were incorporated
in the United States. Thus, the nationality principle does not provide
the United States a basis of jurisdiction over corporations organized
and operating in third countries, even though the corporations are owned
or controlled by United States residents or nationals.
30. Brownlie, supra note 21, at 291-97.
31. Greig, supra note 19, at 213-14.
32. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 211.
33. Id.
34. Levi, supra note 14, at 140; Restatement (Third), supra note .20, § 211 cmt. c.
35. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 211 cmt. c.
36. Id. § 211 cmt. d.
37. Id. See Levi, supra note 14, at 141.
38. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 213; Restatement (Second), supra note 23,
§ 27; Greig, supra note 19, at 397.
39. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 213 cmt. c.
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The universality principle provides all states with jurisdiction over
offenses contrary to the interest of the international community. 40 Piracy
and war crimes are well accepted examples of such offenses.4 1 Slave
trade, hijacking of aircraft, genocide, and certain acts of terrorism are
also fairly well accepted as offenses contrary to the international com-
munity. 42 However, this principle does not provide a basis of jurisdiction
for the Cuban Democracy Act's prohibition of trade with Cuba because,
generally, trading acts are not recognized as offenses contrary to the
international community.
The protective principle provides a state jurisdiction over an alien's
extraterritorial acts directed against the security of the state or the
integrity of its function. 43 Examples of acts supporting jurisdiction are
espionage, counterfeiting of the state currency or seal, and falsification
of official documents." Because the acts prohibited by the Cuban De-
mocracy Act are not directed against the security or integrity of the
United States, the protective principle does not provide a basis of jur-
isdiction for the Cuban Democracy Act's prohibition of trade.
The passive personality principle is the least accepted basis of jur-
isdiction. It permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over aliens who
commit crimes against its nationals outside the state's territory. 45 "The
principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes,
but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality."" The
Cuban Democracy Act does not address aliens' crimes against United
States nationals outside the United States; instead, it addresses aliens'
trade with Cuba and Cuban nationals. Thus, the passive personality
principle does not provide a basis of jurisdiction for the Cuban De-
mocracy Act.
The five traditional bases of jurisdiction do not provide support for
the authority of the United States to prohibit trade between Cuba and
United States owned or controlled firms organized and operating in third
countries. Thus, the Cuban Democracy Act violates international law.
Indeed, late last year the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution implying such.4 7
40. Joseph G. Starke, Introduction to International Law 234 (1989).
41. Id.
42. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 404.
43. Greig, supra note 19, at 213-14.
44. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 402 cmt. f.
45. Levi, supra note 14, at 145.
46. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 402 cmt. g.
47. On November 24, 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
proposed by Cuba expressing concern over "the promulgation and application by member
states of laws and regulations whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of other
19931 1395
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C. The United States' Position and Restatement § 414
The United States State Department takes the position that the
traditional principles of jurisdiction are not exclusive.4" Its position is
that international law imposes
a threshold requirement that a state have a sufficient nexus with
the matter to justify an assertion of jurisdiction. The traditional
categories of jurisdiction ... [are] seen as the principal kinds
of nexus generally considered sufficient, but the sufficiency or
basic reasonableness of other kinds of connections ... [can]
not be excluded a priori.49
The State Department is not alone in its contention. The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations similarly recognizes certain situations where
jurisdiction is justified under international law other than by the five
traditional bases.5 0 The "Restatement represents the opinion of The
American Law Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would
apply if charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with inter-
national law."'" Section 414 of the Restatement concerns the issue pre-
sented by the Cuban Democracy Act-jurisdiction over corporations
owned or controlled by nationals, but organized and operating in foreign
states. Section 414 states:
§ 414. Jurisdiction with Respect to Activities of Foreign Branches
and Subsidiaries
(1) . .. a state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe for limited
purposes with respect to activities of foreign branches of corp-
orations organized under its laws.
states and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction." UN
Votes Against U.S. on Embargo of Cuba, Chi. Trib., Nov. 25, 1992, § 1, at 10 (quoting
the resolution's preamble). The resolution specifically mentioned "the recent promulgation
of measures of that nature aimed at strengthening and extending the economic, commercial
and financial embargo against Cuba." U.N Denounces New U.S. Embargo Against Cuba,
St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 25, 1992 (quoting the resolution's preamble). The resolution
calls on states to 'refrain from promulgating and applying' such laws and measures 'in
conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international
law' and it urges states that have such laws to repeal them." UN Votes Against U.S.
on Embargo of Cuba, supra.
The resolution may be as much a political statement as a legal one. United Nations
General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding. Additionally, although the resolution
passed by a vote of 59 to 3, there were 71 abstentions and representatives of 42 nations
failed to attend the vote. Stanley Meisler, U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Cuba Embargo, L.A.
Times, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al.
48. David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United
States Government Approach, 50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 283, 290-93 (1987).
49. Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
50. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 414 cmt. a.
51. Id. Introduction, at 3.
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(2) A state may not ordinarily regulate activities of corporations
organized under the laws of a foreign state on the basis that
they are owned or controlled by nationals of the regulating state.
However ... it may not be unreasonable for a state to exercise
jurisdiction for limited purposes with respect to activities of
affiliated foreign entities
(a) by direction to the parent corporation in respect of
such matters as uniform accounting, disclosure to investors,
or preparation of consolidated tax returns of multinational
enterprises; or;
(b) by direction to either the parent or the subsidiary in
exceptional cases, depending on all relevant factors, in-
cluding the extent to which
(i) the regulation is essential to implementation of a
program to further a major national interest of the state
exercising jurisdiction;
(ii) the national program of which the regulation is a
part can be carried out effectively only if it is applied
also to foreign subsidiaries;
(iii) the regulation conflicts or is likely to conflict with
the law or policy of the state where the subsidiary is
established.
(c) In the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph (b),
the burden of establishing reasonableness is heavier when
the direction is issued to the foreign subsidiary than when
it is issued to the parent corporation.5
An application of Restatement § 414 does not recognize the authority
of the United States under international law to prohibit trade between
Cuba and United States owned or controlled corporations in third coun-
tries.
The Restatement fails to provide guidance as to what is an "ex-
ceptional case." 53 Although situations in which the regulating state is
at war may present an exceptional case,54 the meaning of the term is
not clear. The Cuban Democracy Act cites the Castro regime's "con-
sistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights.""
The Act also states that "the evident inability of Cuba's economy to
52. Id. § 414.
53. Id. § 414(2)(b).
54. Id. § 213 cmt. d.




survive current trends, provide[s] the United States ... with an un-
precedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy
in Cuba. ' 5 6 These observations may be true, but the situation in Cuba
is not as exceptional as the United States' involvement in warfare.
Although unfortunate, this situation does not seem more exceptional
than many normally encountered in foreign affairs; thus, arguably this
is not an exceptional case.
But, assuming the Cuban situation presents an exceptional case under
Section 414, an analysis of the reasonableness of the jurisdiction is
necessary.7 Because the direction to cease trading is issued to the sub-
sidiary, the United States bears a heavier burden of reasonableness to
justify the jurisdiction. 8 Three factors are suggested to assess the rea-
sonableness of jurisdiction: (1) the extent to which the extension of
jurisdiction is essential to further a major national interest, (2) the extent
to which the national program could be carried out effectively only if
applied to subsidiaries, and (3) the extent to which the regulation conflicts
or is likely to conflict with the law or policy of the state where the
subsidiary is located.59
First, to what extent is the extension of the prohibition of trade
with Cuba essential to further a major national interest? The United
States does have an interest in preventing human rights abuses and in
the promotion of democracy in third countries. But, the interest here
seems less national in scope than a situation directly involving the rights
of the United States or its citizens, as in times of war or hostage
situations. And with the apparent collapse of the Soviet Union and its
lessened economic and political support of the Cuban government, Cuban
destabilization of Latin American governments seems less of a threat.
At the least, the United States' interest would be less than before the
downfall of the Soviet Union.
Second, to what extent can the national prohibition of trade with
Cuba be carried out effectively only if also applied to subsidiaries? If
the prohibition were not extended to subsidiaries, the congressional goal
of denying Cuba the goods, technology, and capital of the United States
market could be frustrated or easily avoided. In fact, according to the
United States Treasury Department, trade between overseas United States
subsidiaries and Cuba was $700 million in 199 0.60 Though this amount
is concededly less than probably would be generated if direct trade from
56. Id.
57. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 414(2).
58. Id. § 414(2)(c).
59. Id. § 414(2)(b).
60. Bush Signs Anti-Cuba Law, supra note 29.
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the United States was permissible, $700 million is still a substantial
amount of trade and a substantial frustration of Congress' intent.
Finally, to what extent is the extension of the embargo to foreign
subsidiaries likely to conflict with the law or policy of the state of the
subsidiaries? This factor weighs heavily against the reasonableness of
the jurisdiction because the Cuban Democracy Act effectively prohibits
trade by United States owned or controlled firms in precisely those states
whose policy or law requires or promotes trade with Cuba.6 The protest
by third states to this asserted jurisdiction indicates the third states'
perception of the severity of this conflict between their own laws and
the prohibition. 62
Considering the heavy burden the United States must meet to justify
jurisdiction, the application of the three factors bearing on reasonable-
ness, and the general restrictive language of the section as a whole, the
exercise of jurisdiction does not seem reasonable. In light of the un-
reasonableness of jurisdiction and the doubtfulness that this is an ex-
ceptional case, Section 414 does not support the jurisdiction of the
Cuban Democracy Act. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction over United
States owned or controlled firms located in third countries is not rec-
ognized as proper under international law by Restatement § 414.
Because the extraterritorial jurisdiction asserted by the CACR and
the Cuban Democracy Act are not recognized as valid by either the
traditional bases of jurisdiction or Restatement § 414, they violate in-
ternational law. The next question is how this jurisdictional violation
of international law affects the validity of the Cuban Democracy Act
in the United States legal system.6 1
Ill. UNITED STATES LAW
A. The Role of International Law in the United States Legal System
As a state in the international community, the United States is
subject to customary international law. Indeed, customary international
law is recognized as part of our federal law. It is well settled that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts ...of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their de-
61. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1706, 106 Stat. 2578
(1992); Cuban Assets Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1992).
62. See supra note 4.
63. It seems likely that the United States' assertion of jurisdiction would not be
looked upon favorably by a foreign or international court in an enforcement proceeding
or a challenge to such. See Judgment of May 22, 1965 (Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy),
Cours d'appel, 1965 J.C.P. II, No. 14,274 bis (Fr.).
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termination." '64 As federal law, it is subject to modification or repeal
by subsequent legislative acts. Otherwise, "where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations .... "65 A United
States court cannot look beyond United States law.66 Thus, an inter-
national obligation incorporated into United States law which is modified
or repealed, will not be given effect as United States law, although the
international legal obligation of the United States remains.
Two rules of statutory construction particularly concern the modi-
fication or repeal of international custom as federal law. First, legislation
is presumed to apply only territorially unless clearly indicated otherwise. 67
Second, if fairly possible, a statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law. 68
The intent that the CACR prescribe conduct extraterritorially seems
clearly indicated. Under authority of the TWEA, 69 the CACR contains
the sweeping prohibition of all "transactions involv[ing] property in
which . . . [Cuba], or any national thereof, has . . . any interest [in]
whatsoever, direct or indirect." '70 It applies to any "person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." 71 The broad definition of this
term indicates unambiguously the intent that the prohibition apply ex-
traterritorially, thus defeating the contrary presumption. The Cuban
Democracy Act's disallowal of licensing for "firms in third countries"
to trade with Cuba, leaving these firms subject to the continuing CACR
prohibition, reaffirms this intent.
Because there is no basis of jurisdiction validating the CACR and
the Cuban Democracy Act, international law prohibits their regulation
of trade between Cuba and United States resident or national-owned or
controlled firms organized and located in third countries.72 Yet, the
Cuban Democracy Act and the CACR clearly express the contrary intent
to control these activities. Thus, it is not possible to fairly construe
these acts to comply with international law.
64. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 299 (1900).
65. Id., 20 S. Ct. at 299.
66. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599, 5 S. Ct. 247, 254 (1884); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
67. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co,, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991); Foley Bros.
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S. Ct. 575, 577 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 437, 52 S. Ct. 252, 254-55 (1932).
68. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 114.
69. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988)).
70. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1992).
71. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1) (1992). See definition of the term "person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" supra in text accompanying note 9.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 20-57.
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Because the Cuban Democracy Act and the CACR are intended to
apply extraterritorially, and the expressed intent conflicts with interna-
tional law, the statutes should be construed to apply extraterritorially,
thus overriding international law principles of jurisdiction as United
States law.
B. The Constitution and Judicial Treatment of Extraterritorial
Legislation
Under our system of Federalism, the federal government possesses
the powers delegated to it by the Constitution."' But these delegated
powers of the federal government are limited by constitutionally guar-
anteed individual rights, such as those contained in the Bill of Rights.
74
It is well established that a federal court has the power to refuse to
give effect to executive and legislative acts if they are inconsistent with
the Constitution. 7 This power of refusal can extend even to acts which
affect international relations like the CACR and the Cuban Democracy
Act.
But surprisingly, there has been little judicial analysis of the con-
stitutionality of the extraterritorial application of federal law. 76 A leading
case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,77 concerned the ap-
73. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const.
amend. X. But see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18,
57 S. Ct. 216, 219-20 (1936)
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is cate-
gorically true only in respect of our internal affairs .... [Tihe investment of
the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend
on affirmative grants of the Constitution.
74. This is also true for the possibly extra-constitutional powers inherent in sovereignty
recognized in Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216. See also Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 58, 78 S. Ct. 568, 576 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 87 S. Ct. 1660 (1967).
Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate foreign affairs
must be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining Congress in the
exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply
with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other
nations.
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
76. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1219 n.12 (1992).
77. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Lea Brilmayer, An Introduction to Juris-
diction in the American Federal System 305 n.87 (1986) "[The case] was brought before
the Supreme Court, but more than half the Justices disqualified themselves. The case was
then certified to the Second Circuit .... [T]he decision is binding in all circuits."
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plication of the Sherman Act to an extraterritorial conspiracy between
foreign parties. Judge Learned Hand's opinion stated, "[T]he only ques-
tion open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and
whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so . . . . 7 Although
the opinion addressed congressional intent, the expected constitutional
analysis never appeared. Other cases similarly address only congressional
intent,7 9 and the Court has never invalidated the extraterritorial appli-
cation of federal law on constitutional grounds. 80 Indeed, "constitutional
arguments rarely have been advanced in the briefs of parties resisting
the extraterritorial application of federal law.''81
Perhaps constitutional review of such laws has been pretermitted by
the common notion that acts which affect international relations are
beyond judicial scrutiny. The political question doctrine holds that certain
matters are inappropriate for judicial review. In Baker v. Carr,82 the
Court stated the following test:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent res-
olution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.83
Matters touching on foreign relations are often deemed political questions
because resolution of these issues frequently turns "on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demon-
strably committed to the executive or legislature, [or the situation] uniquely
demands a single-voiced statement of the government's view." 8 4
The Cuban Democracy Act does touch on foreign affairs because
the Act regulates transactions between Cuba and firms located in third
countries. But, as the Court stated in Baker v. Carr, "[I]t is error to
78. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 443.
79. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 76, at 1219 n.12 (citing cases).
80. Id.
81. Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodo-
logical and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 11, 25 (1987).
82. 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962).
83. Id. at 217, 82 S. Ct. at 710.
84. Id. at 211, 82 S. Ct. at 707.
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suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance.""8 Many of the factors favoring non-
justiciability of matters touching on foreign affairs are not presented
by the Cuban Democracy Act. Judicial review of legislation is a recurring,
accepted task with well-defined and manageable standards. It is one of
the judiciary's characteristic roles under the Constitution, and should
not be avoided merely because deciding the legal issue may result in
significant political consequences.16 The political question doctrine, there-
fore, should not prevent judicial review of legislation, such as the Cuban
Democracy Act, that regulates trade extraterritorially.
C. Congressional Power to Legislate Extraterritorially
Three possible constitutional grounds for the Cuban Democracy Act
are: the Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause coupled with the federal government's
foreign relations power.
The Commerce Clause provides Congress the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." '87 Under the current standard of review, the power
"to regulate Commerce . .. among the several States" is extremely far-
reaching. The judiciary will defer to congressional choices in this area
and uphold Congress' power if there is a rational basis upon which
Congress could find a relation between its regulation and interstate
commerce. 88 In the review of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, Congress' motive in passing the legislation is irrelevant.8 9
There are two principal ways in which an item, person, or activity
may come under the commerce power.90 First, Congress may control
interstate travel or shipments. 91 Second, it may control "any activity,
including 'single state' activities, if the activity has a close and substantial
relationship to, or effect on, commerce.''92 This relationship or effect
may be based on theoretical economic relations; and an activity may
85. Id., 82 S. Ct. at 707.
86. See Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106
S. Ct. 2860, 2866 (1986) ("But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic
roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responbility because our decision
may have significant political overtones.").
87. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
88. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 4.8 at
395 (2d ed. 1992).
89. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971) (federal crime);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377 (1964) (civil rights).
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be subject to regulation if the activity is one of a type of activities
having a cumulative effect on interstate commerce. 91
Considering the amount of trade by foreign firms owned or con-
trolled by United States residents or nationals, the firms' trade activities
could rationally result in economic effects in the several states. Addi-
tionally, the failure to regulate this extraterritorial activity, while doing
so territorially, could rationally affect interstate commerce by encour-
aging the extraterritorial flight of United States corporations and capital.
Thus, under the current standard of review, the power "to regulate
commerce . . .among the several States" provides a constitutional basis
of authority for the Cuban Democracy Act.
The power "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations" might also
provide a constitutional basis of authority for the Cuban Democracy
Act under a standard of review similar to that concerning interstate
commerce. The national plan to regulate commerce with Cuba, to deny
Cuba the goods, technology, and capital of the United States market
could be frustrated and easily avoided if United States resident or
national-owned or controlled firms in third countries are not also reg-
ulated. Because in 1990 trade by United States subsidiaries with Cuba
was $700 million, Congress could rationally conclude that these extra-
territorial activities are rationally related to, or have an effect on,
commerce with foreign nations.
Another constitutional ground for the Cuban Democracy Act is the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Under that clause, Congress possesses the
power "[tlo make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.'' 94 In M'Culloch v. Maryland,"
the Court construed the Necessary and Proper Clause and consequently
defined the basic limits of implied congressional power. 96 The Court
stated:
[T]he sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution,
which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned
to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
93. Id.
94. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
96. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 301 (2d ed. 1988).
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that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.97
Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause implies congressional power to
use all means reasonably calculated to effect not only the ends within
the congressional powers enumerated in Article I, § 8, but it also implies
the power to use all means reasonably calculated to effect the ends
within the cumulative powers vested in the government of the United
States. 98
It is well accepted that the government of the United States is vested
with plenary power over foreign affairs. 99 As the Court stated in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States:"0 "The United States are a sovereign and
independent nation and are vested by the Constitution with the entire
control of international relations, and with all the powers of government
necessary to maintain that control, and to make it effective.""", And,
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,102 the Court stated:
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs .... [Tihe investment of
the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty
did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.0 3
In Perez v. Brownell,'10 the Court recognized the constitutionally
implied power of Congress to regulate foreign affairs.10 The Court
stated:
Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Con-
gress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation
of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of
this power in the law-making organ of the Nation. The States
that joined together to form a single Nation and to create,
through the Constitution, a Federal Government ... must be
held to have granted that Government the powers indispensable
to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign
nations.'06
97. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
98. Id.; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Tribe, supra note 96, at 301-03.
99. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 15-28 (1972).
100. 149 U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893).
101. Id. at 711, 13 S. Ct. at 1021.
102. 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936).
103. Id. at 315-18, 57 S. Ct. at 219-20.
104. 356 U.S. 44, 78 S. Ct. 568 (1958).
105. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 88, § 6.2 at 493.
106. Perez, 356 U.S. at 57, 78 S. Ct. at 575 (citations omitted).
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Congress could have reasonably concluded that the prohibition of
trade between Cuba and overseas firms owned or controlled by United
States residents or nationals relates to foreign affairs. The economic
embargo of Cuba is the United States' means of indicating our national
displeasure with the human rights abuses by the Cuban government, in
hopes that the economic pressure upon Cuba will curb these activities
and hasten democratic change. Allowing or prohibiting trade with Cuba
by United States owned or controlled firms in third countries could
impact upon the perceptions of Cuba and the international community
regarding our national position on Cuba and its activities. Additionally,
the allowal or disallowal of trade with Cuba by these firms could impact
upon the effectiveness of the national embargo of Cuba. Thus, the
Necessary and Proper Clause coupled with the federal government's
plenary power to control foreign relations provides a Constitutional basis
of power for the Cuban Democracy Act.
Therefore, there are three possible constitutional bases of power for
the Cuban Democracy Act's regulation of trade between Cuba and United
States resident or national-owned or controlled firms organized and
operating in third countries: the Commerce Clause, the Foreign Com-
merce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause coupled with the
federal government's foreign relations power. Nevertheless, the consti-
tutional scrutiny should not end upon a finding that Congress intended
extraterritorial application and has the power to create such a law. A
court's scrutiny should also determine whether the application of the
law violates another provision of the Constitution.
D. Constitutional Limitations on the United States' Extraterritorial
Power
Although the powers of the federal government are limited by con-
stitutionally guaranteed individual rights, the Court has recognized that
not every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States
government exercises its powers. m0 7 For instance, in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,108 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tections did not apply to a search and seizure by United States agents
of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
nation.10° The Court reasoned that the term "the people" in the Fourth
Amendment "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection[s]
107. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1062
(1990).
108, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
109. Id. at 259, 110 S. Ct. at 1056.
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with this country to be considered part of [the] ... community." 110
The Court noted that the term "the people" is also used in the First,
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. Apparently, these limitations
upon governmental power are not available to those who are not part
of the national community or who lack significant connections to the
community to be considered part of the community.
In contrast, the Court noted that the Fifth Amendment "speaks in
the relatively universal term of 'person."'""1 In Johnson v. Eisentrager,1"2
the Court rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment
rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States. But, as the
Eisentrager opinion acknowledged, in some cases constitutional provi-
sions extend to those who are not citizens. The Court stated that "It]he
alien ... has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights
as he increases his identity with our society.""' 3 Indeed, in Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Court recognized that the alien defendant possessed the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the privilege
against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of all defendants
in the United States legal system. 11 4
Although several lower court cases state there are no constitutional
issues raised by the extraterritorial application of United States law,",
several Ninth Circuit cases hold there are due process limitations on the
extraterritorial application of United States law. 11 6 The early Ninth Circuit
cases equated the constitutionality of Congress' exercise of jurisdiction
with international law jurisdictional principles.1 1 7 But, in United States
v. Davis,"8 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the two:
International law principles may be useful as a rough guide of
whether a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the
110. Id. at 265, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
I11. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
112. 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936 (1950).
113. Id. at 770, 70 S. Ct. at 940.
114. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060
(1990) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964)).
115. Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1031, 105 S. Ct. 1403 (1985); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134,
136 (5th Cir. 1980); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 76, at 1219 n.12.
116. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486; 494 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-
52 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 1646 (1977).
117. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 76, at 1219 n.12; Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2
(citing United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (extraterritorial application of statute
is justified by the protective principle and is constitutional) and United States v. King,
552 F.2d 833, 851-52 (extraterritorial application of statute is justified by nationality and
objective territorial principles and is constitutional)).
118. 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
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United States so that application of the statute in question would
not violate due process. However, danger exists that emphasis
on international law principles will cause us to lose sight of the
ultimate question: would application of the statute to the de-
fendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair? 19
The Cuban Democracy Act prohibits trade between Cuba and United
States resident or national-owned or controlled firms organized and
operating in third countries. These corporations do have a nexus to the
United States since some of their owners are United States nationals or
residents. But, the Cuban Democracy Act prohibits conduct that is either
encouraged or required by law or policy in the third country. In many
situations, this presents the foreign corporation with the choice of either
violating United States law or violating the law of the third state within
which the firm is located. Thus, application of the Cuban Democracy
Act to an individual defendant might be held to be fundamentally unfair
and violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2 0
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Cuban Democracy Act's prohibition of trade
between Cuba and United States owned or controlled firms probably
violates international law. Even though international law is part of federal
law, as such it is overridden by the Cuban Democracy Act's clearly
expressed intent to apply extraterritorially and its inconsistency with
international law. Under current standards of review, constitutional bases
of power for the act are provided by the Interstate Commerce Clause,
the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The only potential limitation to the application of the Cuban Democracy
Act in the United States legal system is the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Although there are few restrictions in the United
States legal system on the power of the United States to prohibit trade
between Cuba and the UnitedStates owned or controlled firms in third
countries, in the international legal system the United States is liable to
119. Id. at 249 n.2 (citations omitted). Results of the Davis approach may parallel
results of the "reasonableness" test of Restatement § 414. See supra text accompanying
notes 50-63. But, the Restatement approach, balancing the interests of the states, seems
more analogous to a conflict of laws analysis. While the due process analysis may consider
the states' contradictory commands in determining whether the extraterritorial application
of the statute is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, the analysis focuses more on the
relation between the United States and the regulated individual, not a balancing of interests
between the United States and the territorial state. Thus, in certain factual situations the
results of the two tests concerning jurisdictional validity may be different.
120. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087 (1958).
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the states within which these firms are located for violating its inter-
national legal obligation. Perhaps more important than these possible
international legal consequences are the international political conse-
quences resulting from this Act.
Allen DeLoach Stewart

